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Risk Budgeting and Longevity Insurance: Strategies for Sustainable Defined
Benefit Pension Funds
Abstract
Today, many defined benefit pension funds across the world are closing in response to twelve years of
intense market volatility and dramatic increases in life expectancy. To the casual observer, it must seem
as though the risk of maintaining a defined benefit pension fund has contributed to its rapid decline.
Certainly, a defined benefit pension is a very significant promise for the plan sponsor, who has pledged to
pay the plan participants for as long as they live and no matter what happens to the assets. The key
question today is whether the defined benefit plans that remain open and accruing benefits for employees
can be sustained. In fact, a sustainability model may be emerging in the best practices of a few pension
plans. These plans generally have three things in common:1. They have engaged in a rigorous risk
budgeting process, involving an analysis of their risk, an estimation of the potential losses in their pension
funds and a decision regarding how much they can afford to lose. 2. They have dramatically reduced their
asset risk in an effort to keep pension losses within the risk budget and they may have two-thirds or more
of their assets invested in a low volatility strategy such as fixed income or total return. 3. They have a
strategy for longevity risk, which may involve longevity insurance to ensure that the quantum of their
liability is known and knowable so that funding and investing activities can be carried out with certainty
as to the ultimate liability. While these strategies may seem less exciting than using risky assets to reach
for high returns, they are rooted in the premise that investing in equities, private equity, commodities,
property and other risky assets actually involves risk and to the extent that those strategies expose the
plan sponsor to more risk than the sponsor can afford, too much risk is likely to lead to the closure of the
pension fund and the elimination of the defined benefit from the employees' future retirement security.
Perhaps risk budgeting and disciplined risk management, combined with new techniques to insure
longevity risk can be used to sustain more pension funds and safeguard the health of the plan sponsors.
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Chapter 12
Risk Budgeting and Longevity Insurance:
Strategies for Sustainable Defined Benefit
Pension Funds
Amy Kessler
The extreme losses incurred in defined benefit (DB) pension plans during the
financial crisis have called into question the conventional approach to managing pension risk. In the aftermath of the financial crisis, many plans have closed
and stopped accruing benefits for new or existing members. Closing a plan, however, only stems the growth in the pension risk—it does nothing to manage the
risk the plan already has. Today, in the wake of unprecedented losses and with
a new understanding of longevity risk, open and closed DB plans in the United
Kingdom, the Netherlands, the United States, Canada, Switzerland, and other
countries continue to search for a new paradigm that manages investment risk,
longevity risk, and intergenerational risk.
Investment risk is the risk that asset performance falls short of expected returns.
Twice in the past dozen years, plans that maintained a high allocation to risky
assets have incurred losses severe enough to overwhelm many plan sponsors.
Longevity risk is the risk that plan participants and eligible dependents live longer
than expected. While longer life is a welcome development, it is also a significant
financial obligation for pension plan sponsors, particularly where the retirement
age has remained the same for decades. Intergenerational risk is the risk that current employees contributing to a pension plan will support current retirees at the
expense of securing their own future retirement benefits. In most open plans, the
number of retired participants is rising much more quickly than the number of
working age people contributing to the plan. This raises questions about sustainability and fairness, particularly where pension deficits are acute, the credit quality of the plan sponsor is weak, and life expectancy is underestimated. Current
employees contributing to such plans are exposed to the risk that the plan sponsor
may not be able to fulfill its future obligations to them.
In today’s low interest rate and low-growth environment, these risks are particularly daunting and the failure to manage them is behind the growing funding
gap for the many DB pensions. The key question is how to develop the strategies
and solutions that will help pension funds regain and maintain a path toward a
stable and sustainable future.
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A ‘DB Pension Sustainability Model’ will combine techniques that already
exist to achieve more predictable outcomes and manage risk within the plan sponsor’s financial wherewithal to absorb losses. The goal is to create a new paradigm
for DB risk that draws from the best available practices in risk budgeting, asset
management, and insurance. One possible approach is described in this chapter
and it includes three components.
First, sustainable risk budgeting involves measuring the key sources of risk that
a pension plan has in order to quantify potential losses, identify areas where risks
compound each other, and establish a targeted level of potential risk of loss from
which the plan and its sponsor could recover over the medium term.
Second is a sustainable asset management approach. With its risk budget in
place, a pension plan can chart a course for a lower risk future, shedding the risks
that are unrewarded (such as interest rate risk) and creating the opportunity to
take risk that is rewarded (such as credit and exposure to equities and alternatives),
all within a sustainable risk budget. Also, custom liability-driven investing (LDI),
alternative fixed income investments, and absolute return strategies are among
the key changes pension funds can make. As asset management choices evolve, a
key paradigm shift takes place, bringing the liabilities squarely into the equation
to choose assets designed to support the liabilities. The overall goal is a lower risk,
lower volatility portfolio that creates a stable base for risk management and a good
expected return relative to its risk of loss in funded status.
Finally, longevity insurance can be used to cover a DB plan’s most significant
demographic risk and achieve three key objectives: (a) to create a known and
knowable future obligation and ease the challenge of managing assets against
unknown future liabilities; (b) to protect the solvency of the pension fund (and its
sponsor) and secure the promises made to plan participants in the event of unexpected longevity; and (c) to addresses the impact of intergenerational risk on current employees in the event of increasing obligations to retirees.
These strategies go hand in hand with the ability to increase the normal retirement age as healthy life expectancy extends, and this approach can put pension funds on a path to a more sustainable future. To succeed, the DB Pension
Sustainability Model must enhance retirement security for plan participants,
include a robust safety net for disabled workers to retire early, and be flexible
enough to adapt to the risk tolerance and financial wherewithal of plan sponsors of
varied size, credit quality, and sophistication.
In what follows, we describe an approach to the DB Pension Sustainability
Model. We look forward to a vibrant discussion of these ideas as the pension industry focuses on helping individuals and institutions prepare for a longer retirement.

The Nature of Pension Risk
A DB pension is a promise to pay monthly retirement benefits to participants for
as long as they live, no matter what happens to the assets. Plan sponsors who have
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Figure 12.1. DB plan sponsors are surrounded by risk.
Note: Categories of asset and liability risks for sponsors of DB plans.
Source: Author’s illustration.

made these promises are surrounded by risk. The risk dial in Figure 12.1 shows
the key sources of asset and liability risk that are part of the pension promise.

Liability Risk
The liability risks shown on the bottom half of the risk dial in Figure 12.1 include
anything that might increase the amount of the benefit the pension fund owes to
its members. Longevity risk is the key source of liability risk and is common to all
DB plans. Many plans base retirement benefits on final or average salary, creating
exposure to salary inflation until plan participants reach retirement age. In addition, some pension plans offer cost of living adjustments to retired participants and
for them, inflation risk after retirement compounds the longevity risk exposure.
Finally, interest rate risk is included in the liability risks because most pension
liabilities are valued by discounting at a high-grade bond yield curve (the ‘liability
discount rate’). This approach is consistent with the fact that pension liabilities are
often the most senior debt of the plan sponsor.
The liability discount rate a pension fund uses to value its future obligations is
the largest driver of the effective rate at which the liabilities grow from one year
to the next (the ‘liability growth rate’). Other factors driving the liability growth
rate include unexpected improvements in longevity and cost of living adjustments offered to plan participants, if any. Failure to earn the liability growth
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rate on actual invested assets results in an increasing funding gap for the pension plan, with the liabilities growing faster than the assets. This challenge can be
particularly acute for pension funds that offer cost of living adjustments to plan
participants.

Asset Risk—The View for Corporate Pension Funds
Asset risks are shown on the upper half of the risk dial in Figure 12.1. As long-term
investors, the conventional wisdom has been that pension funds should take asset
risk, and so investing in equities, private equity, real estate, hedge funds, commodities and other risky asset classes has become the norm. Many pension funds
invest 50 percent to 75 percent of their assets in these risky asset classes by choosing asset managers in each desired ‘style box,’ rebalancing periodically to a pre-set
asset allocation and measuring performance strictly against benchmarks that are
not linked to the liability growth rate. The result of applying this strategy is that
the value of the risky assets fluctuates in ways that bear no relation to the liabilities.
In effect, with risky assets that have no duration and liabilities that have very long
duration, the plan is ‘short duration’ and thus, duration mismatch is also shown on
the risk dial as a key challenge for pension funds.
In the generally falling interest rate environment that has prevailed from June
2007 to the present, remaining in a ‘short duration’ position has meant taking a bet
that rates would not fall any farther. Unfortunately, with US$ ten-year Treasury
bonds falling in yields above 350 basis points over the same time period (U.S.
Treasury 2013),1 betting on steady or rising rates has been a losing proposition for
pension funds, particularly given their present level of underfunding. For pension
funds that remain in a short duration position and continue to bet on rising rates,
it is useful to note that after the Great Depression, rates remained low (with the
ten-year Treasury below 3 percent) for 19 years (Shiller 2013).2 In light of the severity of the recent financial crisis, as well as the credit contraction and deleveraging
that ensued, low interest rates and low growth may persist for a prolonged period.
The key concern in maintaining a high allocation to risky assets and a short
duration position is the risk of losing money that is not recovered over a manageable time horizon. Corporate pension funds generally think about this volatility in
terms of the plan’s funded status, which is calculated as the market value of assets
divided by liabilities discounted at the liability discount rate. When viewed from
the perspective of the pension plan’s funded status, it is the extreme volatility of
the conventional approach that is causing corporate pension funds the world over
to rethink their risk and consider lowering their risk profile to the point where
the potential losses are more affordable and more likely to be recovered over the
medium term.
The evidence of volatility abounds and is directly linked to two facts. First, the
average U.S. pension plan maintains a high allocation to risky assets of 50 percent
to 75 percent. Second, the average U.S. pension plan is underfunded and finished
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Figure 12.2. Funded status volatility.
Note: Funded status data depicts the ratio of assets divided by liabilities of U.S. DB plans in the
Milliman 100 (Milliman 2013) and U.K. DB plans in the FTSE 100 (Aon Hewitt 2013). Cumulative
assets and liabilities are shown aggregated on an accounting basis.
Source: Milliman (2013) (Milliman 100 data); Aon Hewitt (2013) (FTSE 100 data).

2012 with assets equal to just 76.4 percent of its liabilities (Milliman 2013). The
unfunded liability is leverage and, as in any leveraged investing strategy, gains
and losses will be magnified when measured relative to the full amount of the
liability.
Figure 12.2 depicts the funded status of U.S. pension plans in the Milliman 100
since the beginning of 2000, and U.K. pension plans in the FTSE 100 since the
beginning of 2007. With regard to U.S. pension funds, these data show that from
2000 through 2012, there have twice been losses of over 30 percent in funded status terms. First there was the ‘dot-com bust,’ and then, from 2002 through 2007,
U.S. sponsors of DB pension funds in the Milliman 100 contributed over $245 billion. With help from favorable markets, these U.S. plans returned to good health
in 2007, just in time for the financial crisis of 2008, when they lost 30 percent in the
downturn. The plans denoted made over $230 billion in contributions between
2009 and 2012, and they will likely face significant contributions for many more
years in order to approach full funding.
One of the most dramatic things about Figure 12.2 is the fact that, despite
contributing so much cash from the end of the financial crisis through the middle of 2013, U.S. plan sponsors did not move to a sustained higher funded status.
This is precisely because risk-taking remained the norm for the average U.S. plan
throughout this period. Most U.S. plans in 2013 combine leveraged, high allocations to risky assets and a short duration position.
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Liabilities

July 1, 2011, to August 19, 2011:

Rates fall by 115 basis points;
equities fall by 16%

Assets
July 1, 2011

12% funded status decline
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August 19, 2011

90%

Funded status
78%

Figure 12.3. Scenario—real life!
Note: For the period between July 1, 2011, and August 19, 2011, depicts the changes in assets,
liabilities and funded status of U.S. DB pension funds in the S&P 500.
Source: Aon Hewitt (2013).

Consider the period from July 1, 2011, to August 19, 2011 (depicted in Figure
12.3), when interest rates in the U.S. fell by 115 basis points and equities plummeted 16 percent (U.S. Treasury 2013; Bloomberg 2013).3 Given the asset and liability mismatch of the average U.S. pension plan in the S&P 500 at that time, their
asset and liability values were independently volatile. Liabilities rose dramatically
due to the decline in interest rates. In the meantime, assets plummeted because
most of the assets were at risk in equities and other risk asset classes.
U.S. corporate pension funds have encountered this challenge before. In fact,
any time bad news in the economy has caused interest rates and equities to fall
simultaneously, the average U.S. pension plan has experienced dramatic losses
in funded status. The 34 business days from July 1, 2011, to August 19, 2011, were
no exception: with liabilities rising and assets falling, the average U.S. pension
plan fell from 90 percent funded to only 78 percent funded (Aon Hewitt 2013).4
With so much exposure to risk, the rebound one would have hoped for after such a
dramatic six-week period was slow to materialize. U.S. plan sponsors ended 2011
only 4 percent higher, with a funded status of 82 percent, and at the end of 2012,
there was still no more sustained movement toward higher ground: the average
U.S. plan was only 76 percent funded (Milliman 2013). 5
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Asset Risk for Public Pension Funds
While corporate pension funds in the United States, the United Kingdom, and
Canada are focused on funded status, public plans are much more focused on
long-term realized returns. Figure 12.4 shows the volatility of this approach over the
most recent 20 years, assuming investment in the Russell 2000 Equity Index (Russell
Investments 2013) and the Barclays U.S. Aggregate Bond Index (Barclays 2013).
The key goal for most public plans is meeting long-term return expectations,
and the data show that a public pension plan investing in this manner will likely
achieve its long-term targeted returns (often between 7.5 percent and 8.0 percent)
on the assets it has invested. However, U.S. public pension funds rarely have assets
invested that are commensurate with their liabilities; for most underfunded plans,
the current approach is unsustainable.
A hypothetical U.S. public pension plan might have an expected return on
assets of 7.75 percent. Its effective liability growth rate is also at least 7.75 percent of the liabilities, because the future liabilities are discounted at the expected
return on assets. This means that a failure to earn at least 7.75 percent on the
full amount of the liability will result in a growing funding gap for the pension plan. It is worth noting that the actual liability growth rate may exceed
7.75 percent, once unexpected increases in longevity and benefit cost of living
40
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Figure 12.4. Volatility of returns—65 percent equities/35 percent bonds and cash.
Notes: The returns depicted are weighted actual returns, assuming 65 percent from the Russell 2000
Equity Index and 35 percent from the Barclays U.S. Aggregate Bond Index. Weighted returns are
shown from December 1990 to December 2012.
Sources: Author’s calculations from Barclays (2013); and Russell Investments (2013).
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adjustments are included. Figure 12.4 indicates that using a ten-year return on
assets of 7.75 percent will lead many to believe that the plan is achieving its
target. However, the public pension plan may be only 60–65 percent funded,
so it only has 60–65 percent of the assets it needs earning returns. Historical
data show that plans can reasonably expect to earn 7.75 percent on the invested
assets. But plans can reasonably expect to earn zero percent on the unfunded
liability, which can best be thought of as the ‘allocation to air’ in the portfolio. In
fact, the unfunded liability represents leverage in the investment strategy. As in
any levered investment strategy, gains and losses will be magnified when measured in relation to the liability.
A natural question thus arises: how difficult will it be for this hypothetical public
pension fund to overcome the unfunded liability, meet current benefit payments,
and maintain or improve funded status? Figure 12.5 shows how daunting this
challenge is. With 62.8 percent of the liabilities invested and earning 7.75 percent,
and the remainder unfunded and earning zero percent: (a) the plan likely needs to
earn 10.9 percent or 11 percent to remain at its present funded status and avoid an
increasing funding gap; and (b) without cash contributions to improve the funded
status, the plan likely needs to earn 12.7 percent or more on a sustained basis to
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Figure 12.5. The impact of leverage and the disconnect between assets and liabilities.
Note: The return required to maintain or improve the funded status is calculated by Prudential
assuming a typical open public plan in the U.S. with cost of living adjustments in its benefits, a
starting funded status of approximately 63 percent, and benefit payments that increase by 5 percent
per year.
Source: Author’s calculations.
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reach 80 percent funding within ten years. This analysis assumes no unexpected
increase in longevity and no periods of higher than expected inflation.
This analysis demonstrates the depth of the public pension crisis in the United
States and in many other countries where the leverage in the pension fund requires
an unrealistically high realized rate of return in order to avoid an increasing funding gap. It is for this reason that most public pension funds need to consider one
further aspect of a DB Pension Sustainability Model—a Sustainable Contribution
Strategy that will bring potential earnings on actual invested assets into line with
the year-on-year growth in the liabilities.

Longevity Risk Is Material and Often Left Out of
the Risk Equation
A recent Global Financial Stability Report by the International Monetary Fund
(IMF 2012) explains that actuarial science has historically underestimated life
expectancy by a period of three years. To be fair, the poor record around the
accuracy of longevity projections has been driven by the incredible power of
human ingenuity to develop medical treatments that extend human life and it
is clear that increasing longevity is a very positive outcome for many. However,
for sponsors of DB pension funds, increasing longevity also creates a significant
financial obligation that governments, institutions, and corporations will struggle to afford.
The IMF report also points out that ‘appropriate longevity assumptions should
use the most recent longevity data and allow for future increases in longevity’
(2012: 6). The same report suggests that ‘the use of outdated mortality tables
has been a common practice’ among U.S. pension plans and that many in the
IMF sample analysis exhibited a ‘lag of almost a quarter century in their mortality assumptions’ (2012: 13). A similar challenge exists in many countries, where
measurement of current liabilities has not kept pace with known and observable improvements in longevity that have already occurred. The U.K. and the
Netherlands are global role models in mandating the use of up-to-date tables,
while progress remains slow in North America.
As the IMF has pointed out, updating pension mortality assumptions for purposes of estimating today’s liabilities is fundamental in creating the transparency
that key stakeholders need in order to evaluate the impact of longevity risk on the
credit quality of governmental, institutional, and corporate plan sponsors. Merely
updating mortality assumptions is not enough, because there is still uncertainty
around today’s best estimate projections of future pension liabilities. Pension
funds must begin to consider how longevity risk interacts with all of their other
risks and, in many cases, compounds them!
Figure 12.6 depicts the pure longevity risk in a pension fund with 36 percent
retiree liabilities and 64 percent deferred and active liabilities, though no future
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Potential variability in future benefit cash flows
due to longevity risk
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Figure 12.6. Materiality of longevity risk assuming fixed inflation.
Notes: Shows the projected benefits and longevity risk for a pension fund with 36 percent retiree
liabilities and 64 percent deferred and active liabilities, though no future accrual is assumed for
active members. The average age of retired members is 69 and the average age of deferred and
active members is 46. Benefits include cost of living adjustments, which are assumed at a fixed
escalation rate of 3 percent. Longevity improvements are simulated in a fully stochastic analysis.
Source: Author’s calculations.

accrual is assumed for active members. The average age of retired members is 69
and the average age of deferred and active members is 46. Benefits include cost of
living adjustments, which are assumed at a fixed escalation rate of 3 percent in the
graph. The solid line is the best estimate projection of the liability assuming the
fixed cost of living adjustments and the grey bars indicate the risk around the best
estimate determined on a stochastic basis where longevity is the only risk factor
simulated in the stochastic analysis. For every year that life expectancy extends,
the liability will likely increase by 5 percent or more. A more severe stress would
increase the liability by 8 percent to 10 percent from current annuitant mortality
tables but this analysis only stresses longevity.
Since this pension plan offers cost of living adjustments to plan participants,
the risk of longevity and inflation combined is much larger. In the event that plan
participants live longer than expected and inflation is higher than expected, the
liability could increase by 20 percent because the longevity risk is compounded by
inflation risk (see Figure 12.7).6 The increase in risk is relevant for any U.S. public pension plan and any plan (public, institutional, or corporate) in the U.K.,
Canada, or elsewhere that offers a cost of living adjustment.
The fact that liability-side risks compound each other leads to an important
conclusion about risk modeling and risk management. It suggests that hedging
and risk transfer decisions must be made in the context of a fully stochastic analysis of all risks. Hedging and risk transfer decisions made without a combined
stochastic model that brings liability risks into the picture will consistently undervalue the benefits of risk management strategies.
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Figure 12.7. Compounding of longevity risk and inflation risk.
Note: Shows the same pension liability as depicted in Figure 12.6 with both longevity improvements
and future inflation simulated in a fully stochastic analysis.
Source: Author’s calculations.

Bringing Longevity Risk into the Picture
To demonstrate the importance of the compound nature of longevity risk, interest rate risk, and inflation risk, it is useful to consider a different example provided by Guy Coughlan of Pacific Global Advisors. In this example, there are
1,000 retired pension plan participants, all aged 65 and all receiving the same
level of benefit today. There are also 1,000 active pension plan participants,
all aged 45 and all expecting to receive the same benefit at their retirement in
20 years. The base mortality tables assume the U.S. male population, taken
from the LifeMetrics Index. Inflation is expected to be 2.5 percent. In the fixed
liability results, only salary inflation is assumed through the retirement date of
the active pension plan participants with no benefit escalation after retirement.
In the inflation-linked liability results, both salary inflation to the retirement
date and escalation after the retirement date are assumed. The benefit payments
are shown in Figure 12.8 for the fixed liability and the inflation-linked liability
cases.
Thus the pension fund is not well funded and is holding assets of $600, equal to
only 60 percent of the liabilities, assumed to be $1,000. Despite its underfunded
position, the plan has already begun to make its way down a de-risking path and
holds its assets invested in 45 percent fixed income, 33 percent equities, 19 percent alternatives and 3 percent cash. Figure 12.9 provides a risk overview for this
plan. It shows the funded status-at-risk or value-at-risk (‘VaR’) in the pension
fund, reflecting the financial risk in the asset portfolio, as well as the market and
longevity risks impacting the liabilities. For pension funds, funded status-at-risk
is analogous to the VaR measures used by other types of financial institutions.
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Panel A. Fixed liability.
120
100
80
60
40
20
0

10

20

30

40
Years

45-year-old

50

60

70

60

70

65-year-old

Panel B. Inflation-linked liability.
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Figure 12.8. Illustration of fixed liability and inflation-linked liability cash flows (normalized pension payment).
Notes: Panel A: Fixed liability; Panel B: Inflation-linked liability. Depicts normalized pension
payments for 1,000 retired and active plan participants aged 65 and 45, respectively, for fixed
liabilities and inflation-linked liabilities.
Source: Analysis from Pacific Global Advisors.

Funded status-at-risk measures the level of financial risk to the funded status of
the pension fund, taking assets and liabilities into account. Figure 12.9 shows the
amount of the potential loss in funded status at a 95th percentile stochastic stress
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over a period of one year. The stress depicted below can be considered a reasonable worst-case scenario for a one-year period.
The individual asset and liability risks shown here depict the 95th percentile
outcome of a stress in each risk in isolation. For example, asset risks (shown in the
left-most column on each graph) include the risks to equities, interest rates, and
alternatives and they reflect a 95th percentile risk of loss in each asset class stressed
independently. The asset risks are the same in the two cases because each assumes
a portfolio of $600 invested identically. In normal market conditions, these losses
would not be expected to occur simultaneously—rather, some of these losses will
be diversified away, as described further on in the chapter.
The liability risks are shown in the second column of each graph in Figure 12.9.
The liability risks differ in the fixed liability and inflation-linked liability cases.
Relatively speaking, the inflation-linked liability has greater longevity exposure.
This is intuitive, in light of the graphs shown in Figures 12.6 and 12.7, which
demonstrate that the risk of longer life and high inflation compound each other.
In other words, with inflation-linked benefits, a pension fund promises to make
monthly benefit payments to its members that will keep pace with cost of living
Fixed liability risk overview (VaR)
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Figure 12.9. Risk overview for fixed liability and inflation-linked liability cases (VaR).
Analysis of a reasonable worst-case loss scenario for a one-year period for the hypothetical
pension plan depicted in Figure 12.8.
Panel A. Fixed liability deterministic stress.
Panel B. Inflation-linked liability deterministic stress.
Source: Analysis from Pacific Global Advisors.
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adjustments. Should inflation be higher than expected, each additional year of life
carries with it approximately twice the impact on the liability, because the benefit
will be payable in future value terms. For years, we have described this exposure
as ‘longevity risk on steroids.’
It is also of interest to note that the inflation-linked liability has less interest rate risk than the fixed liability. This is due to the fact that liabilities rise in
low interest rate conditions, which are also commonly linked to low inflation environments. If inflation is low, the inflation-linked liability would benefit from lower-than-expected cost of living adjustments. This finding (in which
inflation-linked liabilities are less interest rate-sensitive than nominal liabilities) is
consistent with the fact that inflation-linked government bonds are less volatile in
price terms than comparable nominal bonds.
The third bar in each graph in Figure 12.9 shows the diversification benefit
that naturally arises because the risks detailed in the first two columns are not all
expected to arise at their 95th percentile levels at the same time. Risks in the pension fund, whether on the asset or the liability side, are not perfectly correlated and
they generally are not expected to occur together and in extremis. Consequently,
the risks should diversify each other.
One of the best examples of a natural diversification benefit is longevity risk
and equity risk, which are often thought to be unrelated risks—they may both
occur in extremis by chance but the conventional wisdom is that there is no reason
to expect them to both occur simultaneously in extremis and thus, the diversification benefit of holding the combination of risks is significant.
Another key source of diversification benefit is the relationship between interest rate risks on the asset and liability side. A 95th percentile outcome for interest
rate risk on the asset side would generally occur when rates rise and fixed income
assets fall in value. In contrast, a 95th percentile outcome for interest rate risk on
the liability side would generally occur when rates fall, pulling down the discount
rates used to value the liability and causing the present value of the liability to
rise. These two circumstances are negatively correlated and offer a fairly direct
hedge to the extent that the pension plan holds fixed income assets that are key
rate duration-matched to the liability and are of similar credit quality to the liability measurement benchmark. The diversification benefit of the individual risks is
substantial and can be thought of as reducing the pension fund’s funded status-atrisk by taking into consideration the fact that some of the risks are not correlated
(such as longevity and equity risk), while others are negatively correlated (interest
rate risk on liabilities vs. interest rate risk on assets).
The Total Risk column in Figure 12.9 is shown on the right of each graph. As
a result of the diversification benefit, the Total Risk column is materially lower
than the sum of the Asset Risk and Liability Risk columns, which depict the 95th
percentile risk of funded status loss on each risk measured in isolation. For clarity,
the Total Risk column shows the 95th percentile risk of funded status loss on the
total combination of asset and liability risks, after taking the diversification benefit into account. As expected, the total risk results show that the inflation-linked
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liability has more total risk and less diversification benefit than the fixed liability
case. This is the natural conclusion because the actual liability growth rate of the
inflation-linked liability (with cost of living adjustments) is more likely to outpace
the earning power of the assets than in the fixed liability case, and this risk of
growth in the liability outpacing the growth in the assets is unlikely to be diversified away by the assets this pension plan is holding.

A Simpler View of Crossover Risk
Many find the three-dimensional nature of stochastic VaR analysis challenging
to interpret because the conclusions depend on the correlation matrix embedded in the statistical risk analysis, which drives the degree of diversification benefit among the risks. To address these concerns and provide a two-dimensional
anchor for the risk analysis, it is also useful to look at deterministic stress alongside
the stochastic analysis.
Coughlan’s approach to the deterministic stress is to construct a stress that
is reassuringly similar to a duration calculation.7 For the fixed liability and the
inflation-linked liability, Figure 12.10 shows the impact on the liability of a 1 percent decline in interest rates and a 1 percent per year increase in the future projected trend for mortality improvements (also referred to as ‘q-duration’). Results
are shown separately for the older retiree population (the 65-year-olds) compared
to the younger deferred members (the 45-year-olds) who have yet to retire. We
conclude that longevity risk, interest rate risk, and inflation risk compound each
other. In each case, the combined stress is greater than the sum of its parts (the
interest rate stress and the mortality stress), because an interest rate shock will
have a bigger impact on the liability if the liability increases due to an expectation
of longer life. The difference between the value of the combined shock and the
sum of the two individual shocks (interest rates and mortality) is referred to as the
‘crossover rate and mortality risk,’ and is broken out separately in Figure 12.10.
Both the combined stress and the crossover rate and mortality risk are bigger in
the inflation-linked liability case than in the fixed liability case because inflation
compounds both the mortality and interest rate risks. Also, both the combined
stress and the crossover rate and mortality risk are bigger for the deferred liabilities (the 45-year-olds) than the retiree liabilities (the 65-year-olds) because of their
longer duration. The analysis proves that deferred liabilities are the most risky
obligations for the pension fund.

Implications of Crossover Risk for Risk Analysis
and Risk Management
Given the key conclusion that interest rate risk, longevity risk, and inflation risk
compound one another in the pension liability, it is clear that the current standard
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Figure 12.10. Deterministic stress on liabilities (impact of a 1 percent decline in rates
and a 1 percent increase in mortality improvements). Panel A: Fixed liability deterministic
stress. Panel B: Inflation-linked liability deterministic stress.
Note: Depicts the impact on the liability of a 1 percent decline in interest rates and a 1 percent per
year increase in the future projected trend for mortality improvements.
Source: Analysis from Pacific Global Advisors.
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practice of leaving longevity risk out of pension risk analysis will lead to an underestimation of total risk. This is particularly acute for inflation-linked liabilities and
deferred liabilities, where their longer duration makes them significantly more
sensitive to adverse outcomes. Pension funds and industry practitioners that make
risk budgeting, risk management, and risk transfer decisions without taking these
crossover risks into consideration will underestimate potential losses as well as the
potential benefits from risk management and risk transfer strategies.
To this point, we have focused on pension asset and liability risk and on quantifying and understanding these risks in a manner that is more comprehensive than
current general market practice. From this point forward, we focus on what these
conclusions about risk actually suggest for risk management in the context of a DB
Pension Sustainability Model.

The Role of Risk
For most pension funds, the conventional strategy has relied upon asset risk-taking
activities to minimize overall contributions to the pension plan. Toward that
end, investment activities are often focused on endowment principles of retaining
liquidity premiums, earning risk premiums, and maximizing diversification benefit. In carrying out this strategy, most pension funds have hoped to earn enough
return to outrun increasing life expectancy and offer generous pension benefits
with modest contributions. As shown in Figures 12.2 through 12.4 of this chapter,
the key issues associated with this strategy include: (a) the lack of focus on the liability and its risks; (b) the volatility; and (c) the risk of loss that cannot be overcome
in the medium term.
The challenge for the pension industry today is to modify the conventional
endowment strategy to moderate the role of risk. Figures 12.2 through 12.5 provide the historical data that demonstrate the need for a change in general pension
risk management practices. In the new paradigm, the role of risk must be more
carefully harnessed than has been the case in the past. Potential losses must be
budgeted so their impact on required pension contributions in the medium term
is affordable for the plan sponsor. Within the overall risk budget, pension plans
should still retain liquidity premiums, earn risk premiums, maximize diversification benefit, and seek to minimize overall contributions.
The key change is that all of these activities would be limited and controlled
within the risk budget and, within that risk budget, risk-taking would still have an
important role to play in pension risk management.

Managing Total Risk and Risk Budgeting
In managing the total risk exposure of a pension fund, we have said that it is
important to ensure that the potential losses are budgeted so that their impact
on required pension contributions in the medium term is affordable for the plan
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sponsor. We expect very few to disagree with this goal because losses that are not
affordable can impair the sponsor’s credit quality or render the sponsor insolvent,
leaving the plan without adequate resources to pay benefits to plan participants.
To bring our broadly stated objective forward into risk practice, it is important to
be specific and define each element.
Potential losses refer to funded status-at-risk or total risk as shown in the right-most
bar in each of the graphs in Figure 12.9. This is the potential loss in funded status
in a reasonable worst-case (95th percentile) scenario that takes into consideration
asset risks, liability risks, and diversification benefits. We are focused on funded
status-at-risk because this is the amount the plan sponsor would need to contribute
in cash to overcome these potential losses.
Budgeting the impact on required pension contributions refers to managing the pension fund’s asset and liability risks to try to keep potential losses below a specific
funded status-at-risk or total risk level. Again, the plan sponsor may have to make
contributions of cash to overcome these potential losses, and it is the potential
cash contributions that need to be budgeted and affordable in order to ensure
sustainability.
Medium term refers to the plan sponsor’s reasonable time horizon for recovery
from a market disruption. In some circumstances, the reasonable time horizon
will be driven by regulation in the home country or province of the plan sponsor.
For example, U.K. corporate pension funds are generally required to make cash
contributions to recover from pension deficits within three to five years. U.S. corporate pension funds will increasingly focus on a seven-year horizon in light of
the guidelines in the Pension Protection Act (PPA). Plan sponsors in Ontario also
have a prescribed period over which they must recover. These regulatory recovery
periods can help plan sponsors define the ‘medium term’ because cash contributions may be required over this period to restore the pension fund to good health.
In instances where there is no regulatory requirement for recovery, as is the case
for U.S. public sector pension funds, it will be more challenging, though no less
important, to establish a disciplined construct for budgeting potential losses.
Affordable for the plan sponsor will have a different meaning for every sponsor. In
tailoring the definition of ‘affordability’ to each unique obligor, we recognize that
public pension plans will need to control the impact of potential losses to ensure
the loss is affordable in terms of the sponsor’s debt burden or future tax burden.
In contrast, corporate plan sponsors will need to control the impact of potential
losses to ensure the loss is affordable in terms of their debt burden, considered
alongside such other factors as shareholders’ equity and free cash flow. Today, the
vast majority of pension plan sponsors fail to manage the funded status-at-risk so
that it is affordable in the context of debt burden, future tax burden, shareholders’
equity or free cash flow, but this is the key step in risk budgeting. It is worth considering each of these key metrics in turn.
Debt burden. Today, credit analysts are increasingly aware of the nature of
unfunded pension liabilities, which are the debt of the plan sponsor and which
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may come ahead of any other debt or equity. Losses in the pension fund increase
the sponsor’s debt and, as such, growing pension deficits are increasingly a factor
in rating downgrades and credit analyst commentary. A corporate, institutional,
or municipal plan sponsor must determine whether losses in an amount equal to
the funded status-at-risk would have a detrimental impact on its debt burden if the
potential losses were realized. Given the nature of unfunded pension liabilities,
key stakeholders consider: (a) whether potential losses would cause a debt rating
downgrade or result in negative credit analyst reviews if realized; (b) whether any
debt covenants would be violated; and (c) whether market access or other credit
objectives (such as target debt ratios) of the sponsor would be threatened.
Impact on tax burden. This metric is relevant only to public plan sponsors whose
pension plan contributions are funded by tax revenues or user fees. Losses in the
pension fund may increase the sponsor’s required contributions and create pressure on tax revenues or, where tax revenues cannot be raised, the pension contributions may displace needed public services. A public plan sponsor must consider
whether losses in an amount equal to the funded status-at-risk would have a detrimental impact on its tax burden if the potential losses were realized and the
requisite contributions were made to restore the pension fund to good health. Key
stakeholders consider: (a) whether the potential losses and resulting contributions
would cause tax rates to rise substantially; (b) whether there are legal, constitutional, or practical limits on the potential tax increases that might be violated;
(c) whether tax revenues would need to be diverted from public services to make
the contributions; (d) the probability that the municipal entity would be downgraded; (e) whether market access or other credit objectives of the sponsor would
be threatened; and (f) whether residents and businesses would choose to locate in
other municipalities to avoid the increasing burden of pension risk.
Impact on shareholders’ equity. For corporate plan sponsors, losses in the pension
fund that increase the company’s debt burden also reduce its shareholders’ equity
because the increase in net effective debt does not create any investment in the
enterprise nor any earning power for the firm. Current accounting rules appropriately capture this reality in the balance sheet mark-to-market approach that
prevails today for corporate pension assets and liabilities in the U.S., U.K., and
Canada, among other countries. Given the importance of shareholders’ equity to
investors, many companies are now considering whether the funded status-at-risk
would have a detrimental impact on shareholders’ equity if the potential losses
were realized. It is particularly important to do this analysis for the plan sponsor
alongside all of the other companies in the plan sponsor’s industry peer group to
determine the extent to which the plan sponsor would underperform its peers in a
down market. Cyclical companies must also be very focused on these calculations
because cyclical companies are likely to see declining equity values in the same
market conditions that are challenging for the pension fund.
Impact on free cash flow. To the extent that pension losses trigger a requirement to
contribute cash to the pension fund, a corporation’s free cash flow can be severely
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impacted by pension risk. Moreover, free cash flow is at the foundation of shareholder value creation, which has led to the reasonable conclusion that ‘cash is
king.’ Toward that end, we see companies with limited free cash flow taking the
lead in pension de-risking to minimize potential cash calls on the company and
ensure more consistent financial results within their industry peer groups. There
was a raging debate in the United States before the recent financial crisis as to
whether it was in the best interest of plan participants to moderate or budget the
risk taken in the pension plan to ensure that potential losses would be affordable
from the perspective of the plan sponsor. However, by the end of 2012, the Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corporation in the United States was responsible for benefits to
members of over 25,000 U.S. pension funds whose sponsors had previously filed
for bankruptcy (PBGC 2013). As a result of these insolvencies, the benefits payable
to many of the plan participants were capped below their original levels and the
plan participants experienced the double challenge of a simultaneous decline in
their retirement security and their job security. If potential pension losses are unaffordable for the plan sponsor, plan participants may face this difficult situation.

Allocating the Risk Budget: Choosing Your Risks
Once a plan sponsor defines its risk budget, the focus often turns to trimming
overall risk to bring funded status-at-risk down to the targeted level. In this exercise, pension plans most often begin with a risk assessment such as the one shown
in Figure 12.9 of this chapter. The risk assessment helps to quantify the risks the
pension fund is running in order to begin an analysis of which risks to keep, which
risks to manage, and which risks to shed.
From the point of the initial risk assessment, there are three key considerations in determining a risk reduction strategy. First, the risk assessment clearly
identifies the largest sources of risk, where the greatest impact of risk management can be achieved but charting a successful course to a lower risk future is
never as simple as attacking the largest risks and trimming them back. Second,
it is critically important to consider which risks the plan believes are rewarded
risks and which are unrewarded in order to prioritize rewarded risk-taking
within the risk budget. Finally, the balance of risks is the key to an optimal outcome so that the plan makes the most of the diversification benefit available in
its portfolio of risks.
In the risk reduction journey, we have seen several leading plans establish the
following core principles. First, before risk reduction, interest rate risk, inflation
risk, and longevity risk create a substantial amount of risk for the plan, but: (a) these
risks compound each other; (b) each carries with it a lower expectation of returns
than equity risk and investments in alternatives; and (c) within the overall risk
budget, prioritizing rewarded over unrewarded risks is fundamental. Second, in
reducing the overall level of risk, interest rate risk, inflation risk, and longevity risk
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should be trimmed ahead of equity risk and investments in alternatives. Third,
to make the most of the diversification benefit among the risks, no risk should be
completely eliminated. Fourth, the liabilities matter, so younger plans with a lot
of deferred and active participants will take more risk than mature plans that are
primarily composed of retirees.
The following section describes two real pension plans—one corporate and
one public—that have applied these principles to successfully reduce their pension
risk.

Case Study: A Closed Corporate Plan in
a Cyclical Industry
Several closed corporate plans in the United Kingdom have dramatically
reduced risk by applying the principles described above. They typically began
with the realization that longevity risk, interest rate risk, and inflation risk are
‘unrewarded’ risks that need to be balanced and managed carefully within a risk
budget.
One such plan (depicted in Figure 12.11) was extremely good at fixed income
asset management; it brought its portfolio allocation up to 70 percent to 75 percent
fixed income, including illiquid fixed income (such as private placement loans,
commercial mortgages, inflation-linked ground leases, and high-quality credit
card and auto loan ABS). The fixed income portfolio was built over many years
and in many interest rate environments and allowed the plan to address its interest
rate risk very effectively. Inflation risk was hedged or managed through investments. The remaining 25 percent to 30 percent of the portfolio was in equities,
absolute return, and other alternatives, meaning that the plan could benefit from
the diversification of risk among its various asset classes.
By the time the pension plan was invested in 70 to 75 percent fixed income,
its downside risk was very well managed, but its upside earnings potential was
greatly diminished too. The plan no longer had enough potential in its portfolio to
earn its way out of an unexpected increase in life expectancy. The solution chosen
by this plan was to run its asset portfolio alongside a longevity insurance transaction providing both asset and liability risk management. This strategy works for
any large, sophisticated plan sponsor, though cyclical companies have the biggest
incentive to reduce risk because the biggest pension losses arrive in downturns
when equities and interest rates are falling simultaneously. These are the same
moments when the business would need to conserve cash to manage through the
business cycle. For this cyclical company, having a properly risk-managed pension
plan (with a funded status-at-risk below its risk budget) meant that it could solidify
its industry leadership, create more consistent financial results, and manage from
a position of strength in down markets. Eliminating this fundamental risk to the
company also enhanced the retirement security and the job security of the plan
participants.
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Case Study: An Open Public Plan
The risk budgeting and risk management strategy described above is not only
for corporate plans. Public pension plans can pursue these strategies as well
even though many public plans are still open and actively accruing benefit for
plan participants. In these circumstances, the plan is likely to insure its longevity risk and target a higher asset risk level than a closed, mature plan, as
shown on the right side of Figure 12.11. One public plan that pursued this
strategy combines longevity insurance with a diversified asset portfolio that is
one-third bonds and cash, one-third equities, and one-third absolute return. Its
strategy is based upon risk budgeting and the strong belief that longevity risk
is unrewarded, particularly when combined with (and compounded by) interest rate risk and inflation risk. The plan’s CIO saw the exposure to longevity
risk as a bond that routinely lost 2 percent or more each year. To put a floor on
those losses, the plan decided to hedge away the longevity risk on the retirees
and turn the liability into a known and knowable future obligation. The risk
budget previously taken up by longevity exposure could then be re-allocated to
rewarded risk-taking in the asset portfolio.
This is a revolutionary concept, made possible by longevity insurance. Pension
funds can now choose to hedge longevity risk as an unrewarded risk and redeploy
that risk allocation to rewarded risk-taking in the asset portfolio.
Many have asked what plan participants might gain from this risk management
approach. The answer is likely retirement security. In an open plan for a public
entity that is still accruing benefits for current employees, there is a fundamental
Closed Plan
Longevity risk is insured or hedged

Bonds and cash

Equities

Open Plan
Risk budgeting is used to gauge
whether potential losses are
affordable—longevity risk is insured or
hedged

Absolute return hedge fund

Figure 12.11. Sustainability model.
Note: Summarizes a sustainable asset and liability strategy for a closed plan and an open plan,
respectively.
Source: Author’s illustration.
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question of whether the plan is adequately reserved for the longevity risk of current
retirees and, if it is not, what impact that will have on current employees contributing to the plan. Managing asset risk and hedging the longevity risk of the retirees in
the plan can address the intergenerational risk current employees face in circumstances where pension deficits are acute, the credit quality of the plan sponsor is
weak, and life expectancy is underestimated. This is the essence of the DB Pension
Sustainability Model as it brings into practice techniques for managing investment
risk, longevity risk, and intergenerational risk in today’s open pension plans.

Lessons Learned from Monoline Pension Insurers
There are many differences between most pension funds and the world’s best-run
pension insurers, but first we will focus on the similarities. Both are monolines
that have written pension annuities and therefore grapple with asset risk and longevity risk. The similarities generally end there, because monoline pension insurers manage their blocks of business under insurance principles, while the pension
funds, with the same annuity liabilities, remain focused on the endowment principles of retaining liquidity premiums, earning risk premiums, and maximizing
diversification benefit to minimize overall contributions. The key differences are
presented in Table 12.1.
The key to bringing the DB Pension Sustainability Model into practice is not to
bring pension funds to manage risk fully under the insurance principles applied
to the monoline pension insurers. Rather (in order to address the risks shown
in Figures 12.2 through 12.5 of this chapter), the focus is on finding the happy
medium between the two models for pension funds that seek to sustain themselves
for the long run. The goal is to be able to keep the pension promises they have
made and provide retirement security for plan participants even in the face of
shifting demographics and increasing longevity. The halfway point between the
insurance model and the conventional pension model is a moderate approach
with plans: (a) managing just below fully funded status without any reserves or
capital behind the risk; (b) maintaining a low volatility asset strategy that is heavy
in fixed income and absolute return with a modest allocation to risky assets to

Table 12.1 Comparison of pension funds and monoline pension insurers

Funded level
Asset strategy
Longevity risk strategy
Risk budgeting
Source: Author’s tabulation.

Pension Funds

Monoline Pension Insurers

Generally underfunded
High allocation to risky assets
Generally unhedged
Generally not applicable

Fully funded plus reserves & capital
Asset and liability matching
Generally reinsured
Potential losses < capital and reserves
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benefit from diversification of asset classes; and (c) hedging the longevity risk of
their retirees to ensure sustainability even in the face of longer life.
This moderate approach is designed to benefit from much of the stability of the
insurance model, without the extra capital and reserves it requires. At the same
time, the moderate approach continues to take advantage of some of the diversification benefit among asset classes that is the hallmark of the conventional pension
approach. By combining the two models, it is possible to help pension funds develop
an approach to moderate risk and bring potential losses into an affordable range.

Conclusion
People are living longer lives but the normal retirement age in most countries has
been the same for decades. As a result, there is a demographic shift observable
within many pension plans: the number of retired persons to be supported by the
plan is rising much faster than the number of working age people contributing to
the plan. This intergenerational risk creates an acute need for open pension plans
to move retirement age later with increases in healthy life expectancy.
While this demographic shift continues unabated, a low-growth/low interest rate
environment is creating a substantial funding gap for plan sponsors. Maintaining a
high risk profile to bridge the gap may result in investment losses as unaffordable as
they have proven to be in the first decades of the twenty-first century.
Today’s path for pensions is unsustainable. This chapter develops a way to
budget and moderate risk, provide for increasing longevity, manage the intergenerational risk in the pension plan, and create greater certainty that participant
benefits can be met. The retirement security of many pension plan participants
depends upon it.
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Notes
1. This reflects the history of the ten-year U.S. Treasury, taken from the Daily Treasury
Yield Curve, which was at its highest level in nearly six years on June 12, 2007, at
5.26 percent and has generally fallen for the five ensuing years, to 1.43 percent on July
25, 2012.
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2. The ten-year Treasury rate data collected by Shiller (2013) show rates below 3 percent
for 19 years from 1934 to 1953.
3. Interest rate data are for ten-year U.S. Treasuries, taken from the Daily Treasury
Yield Curve (U.S. Treasury 2013), which was at 3.22 percent on July 1, 2011, and
2.07 percent on August 19, 2011. Equity data reflect the S&P 500 Index, which closed
at 1339.67 on July 1, 2011, and 1123.53 on August 19, 2011 (Bloomberg 2013).
4. Cumulative assets (in US$billions) and liabilities of all pension schemes in the S&P
500 index on the accounting basis.
5. This assumes a pension fund with 36 percent retiree liabilities and 64 percent deferred
and active liabilities, though no future accrual is assumed for active members. The
average age of retired members is 69 and the average age of deferred and active members is 46. Benefits include cost of living adjustments, which are simulated in a fully
stochastic analysis. Longevity improvements are also simulated in a fully stochastic
analysis.
6. This assumes a pension fund with 36 percent retiree liabilities and 64 percent deferred
and active liabilities, though no future accrual is assumed for active members. The
average age of retired members is 69 and the average age of deferred and active members is 46. Benefits include cost of living adjustments, which are simulated in a fully
stochastic analysis. Longevity improvements are also simulated in a fully stochastic
analysis.
7. See also Coughlan (2014).

References
Aon Hewitt (2013). Aon Hewitt Global Pension Risk Tracker [website]. <https://rfmtools.
hewitt.com/PensionRiskTracker>.
Barclays (2013). Barclays Indices [website]. London, U.K.: Barclays. <https://indices.bar
cap.com/index.dxml>.
Bloomberg (2013). S&P 500 Index [website]. New York, NY: Bloomberg, Inc. <http://
www.bloomberg.com/quote/SPX:IND>.
Coughlan, G. (2014). ‘Longevity Risk Management, Corporate Finance, and Sustainable
Pensions,’ in P. B. Hammond, R. Maurer, and O. S. Mitchell, eds., Recreating Sustainable
Retirement: Resilience, Solvency, and Tail Risk. Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, pp.
89–112.
International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2012). ‘The Financial Impact of Longevity Risk,’ in
Global Financial Stability Report 2012. Washington, DC: IMF, pp. 123−153.
Milliman (2013). Milliman 100 Pension Funding Index [website]. New York,
NY: Milliman. <www.milliman.com/expertise/employee-benefits/products-tools/
pension-funding-index/>.
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) (2013). Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
Fact Sheet [website]. Washington, DC: PBGC, April. <http://pbgc.gov/res/factsheets/
page/pbgc-facts.html>.
Russell Investments (2013). Russell 2000 Index [website]. Seattle, WA: Russell Investments.
<http://www.russell.com/indexes/>.

272

Recreating Sustainable Retirement

Shiller, R. (2013). ‘10-Year Treasury Rate,’ Online Data Robert Shiller [website]. New Haven,
CT: Yale University. <http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data.htm>.
U.S. Department of the Treasury (U.S. Treasury) (2013). ‘Daily Treasury Yield Curve,’
Resource Center [website]. Washington, DC: U.S. Treasury. <http://www.treasury.gov/
resource-center/data-chart-center/interest-rates/Pages/TextView.aspx?data=yield
All>.

